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Abstract
History tells us that sustained economic growth, necessary to alleviate poverty in sub-Saharan
Africa, requires growth in the fundamentals, such as infrastructure and human capital, but also
structural transformation, i.e., a reallocation of labor from low-productivity to high-productivity
sectors. I study whether foreign aid is a factor that helps or hinders structural transformation.
I use a dataset on aid projects with precise coordinates from all major donors and match it
to panel data with extensive information on labor market activities for a large representative
sample of individuals in Uganda. I nd consistent evidence that foreign aid reverses the process
of structural transformation. More specically, the local short-term e¤ect of foreign aid is that
people in areas with ongoing aid projects work more in agriculture and less in non-agricultural
sectors. There are no signicant e¤ects on wages or household expenditures for people in the
agricultural sector, but the e¤ects on people in non-agricultural sectors are negative.
Keywords: foreign aid, structural transformation, Africa, AidData, LSMS
JEL classication: F35, O14, O55
1. Introduction
Structural transformation, the reallocation of labor from low-productivity to high-productivity sec-
tors, is a process that all countries that today are rich and industrialized have gone through. The
sectoral share of agriculture falls over time, both in terms of the gross domestic product and in terms
of employment, while the share of the service sector increases. The share of the industrial sector
grows and then shrinks (Duarte and Restuccia 2010, Herrendorf et al. 2014). While this is a core
stylized fact of economic development, this process has during recent decades occasionally moved
backwards on the African continent. Labor moved not from low-productivity to high-productivity
sectors but the opposite during the period 1990-2010, and though there was a reversal of this trend
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in the later part of the period, some obstacles are clearly slowing the pace of the much needed
structural transformation process (McMillan et al. 2014). This has led to concerns about whether
countries on the continent can actually sustain high economic growth (Rodrik, 2016). During the
same period, African countries were recipients of large amounts of foreign aid and their economies
constantly subject to donor involvement. Are these phenomena related? The question asked in this
paper is whether foreign aid helps or hinders the process of structural transformation.
There is some agreement in the literature on the determinants of aid allocation, e.g., that it
is largely determined by strategic donor interests. The impact of aid on economic growth is more
debated, even if some see an emerging consensus that the e¤ect is positive (Arndt et al. 2015a).
The consequences of foreign aid for structural transformation on the national level is still open to
debate. E¤ects found on modern manufacturing or exporting sectors range from negative in the
short term (Rajan and Subramanian 2011), to positive both in the short term (Selaya and Thiele
2010) and the long term (Arndt et al. 2015b). When the e¤ects on the national level are negative,
a Dutch disease type of argument is often evoked. The core of this argument is that an inow of
foreign aid can lead to an exchange rate appreciation, an added burden on manufacturers struggling
to be internationally competitive.
The analysis in this paper is made using data on the sub-national level, and Uganda is well
suited for an analysis of the within-country e¤ects of aid on sectoral labor allocation. Uganda is a
large poor country in sub-Saharan Africa for which there is both georeferenced data on aid projects
and household-level panel data with information about labor allocation by sectors. I match aid
projects to individuals at the lowest administrative level possible, the parish. This allows me to
examine the short-term impact of foreign aid on the process of structural transformation, which at
the individual level is measured using hours worked in di¤erent economic sectors.
The empirical exercise shows that foreign aid projects have a moderate but robust statistically
signicant short-term e¤ect on the local economic structure. In areas with ongoing aid projects, non-
agricultural sectors are depressed while activity in the traditional agricultural sector is encouraged.
There are negative e¤ects on wages and household expenditures, driven by negative outcomes for
people active in industry and services. The implication is that aid projects, in the way that they
are now being implemented, may create obstacles for countries that want to escape poverty by
undergoing structural transformation. Donors need to consider how they a¤ect not only growth
fundamentals, such as human capital and infrastructure, but also the sectoral allocation of labor.
I review the related literature in the elds of structural transformation and aid-e¤ectiveness, as
well as the smaller strand of the literature that concerns the overlap of these elds, in more detail
in the next section. After that, in Section 3, I discuss the data and empirical strategy used in the
empirical analysis. The results of the analysis are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5
concludes the paper.
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2. Related literature
2.1 Aid-e¤ectiveness
The foreign aid paradox states that in developing countries that have got the fundamentals right,
the conditions for investments are already good and investments will already be taking place.1 In
developing countries where the conditions for investment are not good, however, aid money will be
unproductive and a waste of resources. In light if this paradox, it may not be a surprise that so
many studies fail to nd that aid leads to growth.2
Using an instrument based on the income-threshold for certain forms of World Bank-aid, Galiani
et al. (2017) document that aid can have a positive e¤ect on growth. Given the instrument, this
is the local average treatment e¤ect (LATE) of aid received by poor countries because they are
poor, and not necessarily the e¤ect of aid in general. Still, the nding is important as it casts
doubts on the position that foreign aid cannot have a positive impact. Using a di¤erent type of
instrument, Rajan and Subramanian (2008) nd no e¤ect of aid on growth, irrespective of policy
environment, geography, or type of aid. Their instrument is based on the supply of aid and the
character of donor-recipient relationships. As such, their zero-nding is the LATE of aid given
for these reasons. Evidently, well-crafted analyses can reach di¤erent conclusions, and also meta-
studies are hard pressed to nd an agreement. For instance, where Doucouliagos and Paldam
(2009) reveal a negative e¤ect of aid, Mekasha and Tarp (2013) make a few not overly dramatic
methodological adjustments and nd a positive e¤ect.3 The case for aid is weakened by negative
impacts found on other aspects of development. For instance, Djankov et al. (2008) nd a negative
e¤ect on democratic institutions, Svensson (2000) that it leads to more corruption, and Rajan and
Subramanian (2011) that it leads to Dutch disease and therefore hurts exporting sectors.4
An emerging strand of the literature considers the e¤ects of aid on the sub-national level. A
recent study of the e¤ect of World Bank aid on sub-national development is Dreher and Lohmann
1For reviews of the theory and empirics on the impact of foreign aid, see Temple (2010), Qian (2015), and Addison
et al. (2017). The paradox, and the main theoretical arguments why aid still could matter in light of it, are discussed
in Temple (2010).
2Caselli and Feyrer (2007) nd that the marginal product of capital is similar across countries. With this as a
starting point, they argue that developing countries do not have low capital-labor ratios because of poorly functioning
credit-markets, but rather due to a lack of complementary factors, such as human capital and TFP. This suggests two
things. First, aid to regular investments in physical capital should crowd out private capital and not a¤ect economic
growth. Second, if aid instead contributes to the build-up of complementary factors, where additional funds may yield
high social returns but not as high private returns, this will increase the marginal product of capital temporarily,
more investments will be made, and there will be more economic growth.
3Comparisons are complicated by the fact that even ndings published in highly ranked journals have been found
to not be robust to changes in specication and sample (Roodman 2007).
4A number of studies have disaggregated aid into aid from di¤erent classes of donors or aid to di¤erent sectors
of the economy. To mention a few, Easterly (2003) nds that multilateral aid is more e¤ective than bilateral aid,
Clemens et al. (2012) nd a positive role for early-impactaid, which is types of aid whose impact should be seen
within the time frame considered, Dreher et al. (2008) nd that more aid to education leads to higher primary school
enrolment, and Jones and Tarp (2016) nd that aid, especially if targeted to the public sector or the government,
does not on average have a negative e¤ect on institutional quality.
3
(2015). Using regional nighttime light growth as the indicator of development, they nd a positive
correlation, but no causal e¤ect of aid. Some studies use a mix of treatment and e¤ect at di¤erent
administrative levels. Hodler and Raschky (2014) combine a treatment at the national level with
characteristics at the regional level to study outcomes at the regional level. They nd that more
aid at the national level is associated with an increase in nighttime light in regions where the leader
was born.
Aid allocation within countries is determined by factors similar to the donor-recipient relations
uncovered at the national level. In Africa, the birth region of political leaders matter for aid
allocation while objective measures of need do not, both for aid from China (Dreher et al. 2014)
and from the World Bank and the African Development Bank (Öhler and Nunnenkamp 2014). In
India, local needs and political patronage hardly a¤ect World Bank aid allocation across districts
(Nunnenkamp et al. 2017).
2.2 Structural transformation
The process of structural transformation involves a declining share of agriculture in GDP, combined
with an increasing share of services, and a hump-shaped share of manufacturing.5 The core of many
formal models on structural transformation, such as Kongsamut et al. (2001), Ngai and Pissarides
(2007), and Matsuyama (2009), is focused on mechanisms that can explain why structural trans-
formation is occurring in the rst place. In Kongsamut et al. (2001), structural transformation
is driven by the demand side and explained by income e¤ects and non-homothetic preferences, an
argument made similarly in Laitner (2000). Supply side factors are central in Ngai and Pissarides
(2007), where the process is driven by relative price changes due to di¤erences in TFP growth rates
across sectors, and in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), who focus on capital deepening and sectoral
di¤erences in capital intensity. Herrendorf et al. (2013) use data from the U.S. to empirically
investigate the importance of the two main theoretical factors argued to lead to structural transfor-
mation, income changes and relative price changes, and nd that there are merits to both. Duarte
and Restuccia (2010) nd that productivity growth di¤erences (implying relative price changes)
between sectors can explain the patterns of structural transformation across countries. McMillan et
al. (2014) nd that structural transformation is positively a¤ected by exchange rate undervaluation,
consistent with the Dutch disease logic.
2.3 Structural transformation in Africa
In Africa, economic growth after 1990 has been held back the movement of labor from high-
productivity to low-productivity sectors, even if there is a modest contribution to growth from
5These stylized facts are documented in, e.g., Duarte and Restuccia (2010) and Herrendorf et al. (2014). See
Herrendorf et al. (2014) for an overview of theory and stylized facts about structural transformation, but also, e.g.,
Ray (2010), and more recently, McMillan et al. (2016). Some authors prefer the term structural change to the term
structural transformation.
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structural transformation after the year 2000 (McMillan et al. 2014). McMillan and Harttgen
(2014) nd that about half of the economic growth in Africa during the period between 2000 and
2010 is due to structural transformation, with labor moving out of agriculture. Structural transfor-
mation in sub-Saharan Africa in the long term is studied by de Vries et al. (2015), who document
an overall growth of the manufacturing sector during the high economic growth period 1960-1975,
and a growth of services during 1990s. In terms of employment, the manufacturing sectors in the
countries studied by de Vries et al. (2015) have the same share in 2010 as they did in 1990, but
about ten percent of the work force has shifted from agriculture to services.6
2.4 Structural transformation and economic growth
Structural transformation and economic growth are related but should not be confused. As ar-
gued in McMillan et al. (2016), both improvements in the fundamentals, such as human capital
and infrastructure, and structural transformation, where scarce resources move from low- to high-
productivity sectors, are needed.7 To increase the share of manufacturing could also have positive
dynamic growth e¤ects since there is evidence of unconditional convergence in manufacturing (Ro-
drik 2013). A low share of manufacturing in poor countries, and insu¢ cient labor reallocation into
manufacturing, prevents many poor countries from beneting from this convergence. That is, with
manufacturing comes a great potential benet to poor countries in terms of productivity growth
in that sector, and productivity growth at the aggregate level would be greater if more labor had
been allocated to manufacturing to begin with (Rodrik 2013). Another feature of manufacturing
that has made it central to the process of structural transformation and economic growth is its
capacity to employ large quantities of workers with moderate skills that cannot be absorbed in the
agricultural sector (McMillan and Headey 2014).
2.5 Foreign aid and structural transformation
The evidence on the e¤ects of foreign aid on structural transformation on the national level is
mixed.8 That the e¤ects of aid on manufacturing is more positive in the long term (Arndt et al.
2015b) could be because real exchange rate overvaluations fade away once supply has had time to
catch up with the increase in demand. Then, by a¤ecting production prices, the Dutch disease
6Gelb et al. (2014) note that there are highly productive rms in sub-Saharan Africa, and asks why their produc-
tivity has not di¤used more, across sectors or across rms within sectors. They consider three main explanations.
First, a poor business climate with poor infrastructure and excessive regulation crowds out the manufacturing sector.
Second, the economies are less attractive for investments due to small markets and low state capacity, which are
related to geography and colonial history. The third reason is the high prevalence of ethnically based businesses, often
led by minorities.
7 It has been argued that the large agricultural productivity gap, i.e., the di¤erence in value added between agri-
culture and non-agriculture, observed especially in developing countries is due to measurement issues. Gollin et al.
(2014) nd that this is not the case, and suggest that the gap is caused by sectoral misallocation of labor. The
implication is that closing the gap by reallocating labor would greatly increase aggregate productivity.
8For a discussion, see Temple (2010).
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e¤ect on the tradable and non-tradable sectors are counteracted (Selaya and Thiele 2010). That
studies, such as Rajan and Subramanian (2011) and Selaya and Thiele (2010) nd di¤erent e¤ects
also in the short term could be because of di¤erences in data, denition of key outcome variables,
and empirical methods. A reason for why the real exchange rate may not appreciate, and for why
there may be no Dutch disease type of e¤ect even in the short run, is, according to Selaya and
Thiele (2010), the idle labor capacity in developing countries.9
3. Data and estimation strategy
3.1 Data
I combine data on aid projects in Uganda from AidData (Tierney et al. 2011, AidData 2016a) with
panel data on individuals from the Uganda National Panel Survey (UNPS; World Bank, 2017).10
The data from AidData (2016a) covers aid projects by 56 donors between 1978 and 2014, and
includes 565 geocoded aid projects across 2426 locations in Uganda.11 Project details include
aid commitment, aid disbursement, starting date, end date, donor, and aid sector. Projects that
are geocoded have point coordinates that are coded with di¤erent levels of precisions. I follow a
common practice in the literature that uses georeferenced aid data and use project locations that
have AidData precision codes 1 or 2.12 I use these coordinates to assign aid projects to Ugandan
parishes and to the individuals living there.13 A single aid project can be implemented in several
di¤erent locations, each with point coordinates supplied in the dataset, but the data on the aid
amount is not as disaggregated. When there is data on aid amounts, it is only the total for the
project as a whole over the full period the project runs.
As in Dreher and Lohmann (2015), the aid indicators here capture the amount of aid per capita.
The following procedure is followed, and since there will be measurement error in each of these
steps, the estimates I obtain when I use these indicators as explanatory variables will su¤er from
9 It is often argued that whether aid leads to real exchange appreciation depends on the supply side response of the
targeted country. A recent example of this is Addison and Baliamoune-Lutz (2017), who nd Dutch disease e¤ects
of aid on the real exchange rate in Morocco but not in Tunisia, and argue that it reects di¤erences in the domestic
policy response and in supply side factors such as infrastructure.
10Recent studies that also combine these datasets include Odokonyero et al. (2015), who use a di¤erence-in-di¤erence
type of method to establish that aid has positive e¤ects on health outcomes, and Berlin et al. (2017), who use a
matching procedure and nd inconclusive overall e¤ects on gender-related outcomes and attitudes. Civell et al. (2017)
use data from AidData and combine it with a dataset related to the UNPS, the Uganda National Household survey
(UNHS). In a two-stage approach they rst investigate the e¤ect of foreign aid on nighttime luminosity at the district
level, and then the e¤ect the latter has on household expenditures, also at the district level.
11For an overview of the aid history of Uganda, and an analysis showing positive e¤ects of aid on tax revenues
between 1970 and 2014, see Bwire et al. (2017).
12A precision code 1 means that the AidData coordinates correspond to an exact location or populated place,
and a precision code 2 means that the coordinates correspond to a location that is known to be within 25km of the
coordinates or a division smaller than ADM2(AidData 2016b: 3).
13Administrative boundaries are not constant over time. In the present paper, maps on administrative boundaries
from RCMRD (2017) are used throughout.
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attenuation bias and can therefore be seen as conservative. Aid commitments are used since one
of the estimations methods I use rests on the inclusion of an indicator for aid projects that are
yet to be implemented at the time of the UNPS surveys, and since data on actual disbursement
is missing for aid projects that were not completed at the time the AidData was compiled. The
total aid amount, in constant USD, for each project is divided into equal amounts for each project
location and year.14 To calculate the population in each parish, which in Uganda is the fourth
administrative level, maps on administrative boundaries from RCMRD (2017) and on population
from Gridded Population of the World (CIESIN 2016) are used.15 Similar to Hodler and Raschky
(2014), the indicators are created as the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of aid per capita.16
The main aid indicators are thus continuous measures, designed to capture the intensity by which
the population in a certain area is treated by the presence of a foreign aid project. Continuous
indicators, rather than dummy variables indicating the presence or not of an aid project nearby,
are reasonable in this context since the e¤ect on the local economy ought to be stronger if there are
more or larger aid projects in the area.
Data on labor market outcomes is drawn from the Uganda National Panel Survey (UNPS), which
is part of the World Banks Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) project.17 The rst three
waves of the UNPS, the 2009/2010 wave, the 2010/2011 wave, and the 2011/2012 wave, are used,
since these allow for tracking of individuals and households over time, and provide longitude and
latitude of the households.18
The same maps on administrative boundaries that are used to assign aid projects to di¤erent
administrative units are used to assign individuals within households to di¤erent parishes depending
on the coordinates of the household. The longitude and latitude of households supplied with the
UNPS do not reveal the exact location of the households due to a modest random scrambling of
the coordinates. The random o¤set of the coordinates is in the range of zero to two kilometers in
urban areas and zero to ve kilometers in rural areas, with an additional zero to ten kilometer o¤set
14Data on aid commitment in projects with precision codes 1 or 2 that had not already been implemented fully in
2009 and could therefore be used in the present analysis is available for 109 projects covering 599 di¤erent project
locations.
15 In the maps from RCMRD (2017), Uganda has 58 districts (ADM1), 162 counties (ADM2), 967 sub-counties
(ADM3), and 5,342 parishes (ADM4). Uganda covers 241,038 km2, so on average a parish covers 45 km2. The
Ugandan population in 2009 was about 33 million, which means that the average parish population was about 6,200
individuals. I use the method in Dreher and Lohmann (2015) to calculate the parish population, including the linear
interpolation for missing years.
16For each parish, the aid indicators come from rst taking the sum of the assigned aid amounts for each parish
that particular year, then dividing that number by the parish population the previous year. The analysis is made on
the natural logarithm of one plus this per capita amount.
17More specically, it is part of LSMS-ISA. The UNPS is representative at the urban/rural and regional level.
The World Bank/LSMS-ISA team collaborates with the Uganda Bureau of Statistics in the actual management and
implementation of the UNPS.
18Since some people move, one cannot use coordinates from one wave as if they were also the coordinates of the
household in an earlier or later wave. That means that one cannot assign coordinates from later or earlier waves to
the households in the earlier 2005/2006 UNHS (Uganda National Household Survey) or the later 2013/2014 UNPS
survey.
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for one percent of the rural households.19 Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of all household
locations in the three survey waves as well as the full set of geocoded aid projects.
[Figure 1 about here]
The fact that administrative units, such as parishes, are nested within higher administrative units
means that one can include spatial xed e¤ects and time trends at di¤erent administrative levels.
It is also straight-forward to compare results with spatial xed e¤ects at di¤erent administrative
levels with each other. Since individuals are matched to aid projects at the parish level, one can test
whether the results hold if one includes parish xed e¤ects, i.e., xed e¤ects at what I use as the
treatment level. That would not be possible if one had created bu¤er zones around each household,
and used aid projects within these bu¤ers as the aid indicators. Bu¤er zones will overlap each
other and intersect political units at di¤erent administrative levels, such as districts, counties, or
parishes. Spatial xed e¤ects at these administrative levels will then not capture all time-invariant
characteristics at the treatment level. Moreover, it is standard to cluster standard errors at the
treatment level. This is easy to do since the parish is the assigned treatment level. If one used
bu¤ers around each household, standard errors should also be clustered at the household level, and
in short panels this is not optimal. Most important, though, is that ones economic activity is more
tightly linked to events taking place in the administrative unit where one lives, than to events taking
place in bu¤er zones created ad hoc.20
The respondents in the UNPS are asked about the labor market activities of all the members
of their households. For each individual (household member), there are details on the main income
generating activity, which could be either a job or a business, during the week before the survey.
Based on the responses to these questions, I construct a set of indicators of di¤erent aspects of
the labor market and the local economic structure. These indicators, measured at the individual
level, are then used in the analysis to gain insights into whether foreign aid leads to structural
transformation.
The main indicator of sector of activity is Work on Hh farm, the number of hours worked on
the household farm or with household livestock. To complement this indicator, the character of the
main income generating activity will be assessed using details on occupation in terms of main tasks
or duties, and economic sector of activity in terms of the main goods or services produced at the
19When this means measurement error in the dependent variables it leads to less precise estimates, but not to
inconsistency in the estimates. When it means measurement error in the explanatory variables, the estimates will
su¤er from attenuation bias, and can therefore be seen as conservative.
20Both administrative units and bu¤er zones will vary in terms of size of the population and population density.
These factors must therefore be held constant in the regressions irrespectively of whether the treatment is dened to
be on the administrative unit level or on the bu¤er zone level. Administrative units will vary in physical size in a
way that bu¤er zones will not, but one can control for that by including physical area as a control variable in the
regressions, or use area xed e¤ects.
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place of work. Respondents are asked to describe the tasks or duties and the industry with their own
words, and the activity is then assigned the appropriate ISCO (International Standard Classication
of Occupations)-code and ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classication)-code. Following,
e.g., Duarte and Restuccia (2010) and McMillan and Harttgen (2014), the ISIC-codes are used to
distinguish between hours worked in the agricultural, industrial, or service sectors. The ISCO-codes
are used to distinguish between hours worked in agricultural, industrial, or service occupations.21
For summary statistics and a detailed description of all key variables, see Tables A.1 and A.2 in
Appendix A.
The sample consists of all household members represented in any of the three survey waves, that
are ten years old or more, that in the surveys are coded as usual members of the household, i.e.,
they have stayed with the household for at least six of the last twelve months, and that are not
included in the household roster because they are servants to the household.
3.2 Estimation strategy
Aid projects are not randomly allocated. In a naïve bivariate regression with aid projects as the
independent variable and some labor market outcome as the dependent variable, the estimate would
su¤er from an omitted variables bias.
One of the methods I use to deal with this problem shares important characteristics with the
di¤erence-in-di¤erence method. This method retains variation both between and within parishes
and is similar to the one used recently in economics and political science in the context of foreign aid
(Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018, 2017) and mining (Kotsadam and Tolonen 2016, Knutsen et al. 2016).
To ensure that the underlying assumptions, which is those of the di¤erence-in-di¤erence method,
are reasonable I hold constant a number of factors that I believe to be good candidates for both
explaining where aid projects are allocated and for being correlated with the labor market outcomes
that I am interested in. The following characteristics of the location where the individuals live are
provided by UNPS and are calculated using the exact location of the households: urban/rural area
status, percent agriculture within one kilometer, distances to market, to headquarters of district of
residence, to nearest land border crossing, to nearest major road, and to nearest population center,
elevation and slope, annual mean of temperature and precipitation, and mean temperature and
precipitation of the wettest quarter. I supplement these with indicators I calculate at the level of
the parish: population density and nighttime light emission in the year 2000, physical size, and
size of the population during the previous year. Individual-level characteristics always included are
gender, age and age-squared, ethnic group dummies, but also ethnic group-by-gender-dummies, and
a gender-by-urban dummy. Since the time period studied here is short, I assume that the role of
other, unobserved, determinants of the within-country allocation of aid projects is approximately
constant. Then, under the common trends assumption, the omitted variables problem is solved by
21As these are dependent variables, measurement error here will lead to less precise, yet still consistent, estimates.
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including measures both for aid projects that are currently being implemented and for aid projects
yet to be implemented. Conditional on the included control variables, the di¤erence between the
estimates of the ongoing and future aid projects will not be a¤ected by unobservable time-invariant
characteristics that determine whether areas will ever be targeted by foreign aid. Individuals in
areas without aid projects, in the past, the present, and the future, serve as the control group. I
estimate the following equation:
Yipt = 1 Ongoing aid=capitapt + 2  Future aid=capitapt + d + t
+d  t+  Xit +  Xp + "ipt (Equation 1)
Yipt is the labor market outcome measure for individual i, in parish p, at time t. Ongoing
and Future aid/capita are the parish per capita amountss of aid in aid projects currently being
implemented and projects yet to be implemented. Ongoing aid projects are projects that had
a start date no later than the year of the survey and had an end date not prior to the year of
survey. Future aid projects are projects that started no earlier than the year after the survey.22
d are district xed e¤ects (parishes are nested within districts), d represents linear district time
trends that together with the year-by-month xed e¤ects (t) capture seasonal and within-country
trends and aggregate shocks, Xit is a vector of individual-by-time-level controls, and Xpt is a vector
of parish level controls. The time-invariant and time-varying covariates make the common trends
assumption credible, but will also reduce noise and give more precise estimates.23 Details on what is
included in these vectors is discussed above, but can also be found in the notes to the rst regression
table, Table 1. Standard errors ("ipt) are clustered at the parish level.
The estimates of 1 or 2 cannot be given a causal interpretation in isolation since they are both
likely to be biased due to omitted variables. However, their di¤erence, 1   2, is a di¤erence-in-
di¤erence type of measure, and it is this di¤erence that is in focus when the results are presented in
Section 4. If positive, it says that conditional on the underlying probability that the parish attracts
aid, which is captured by the measure for yet to be implemented aid projects and other the control
variables, aid projects currently being implemented in the parish have a positive e¤ect on the labor
market outcome studied.
The UNPS data has a panel structure, but most of the variation in aid project exposure dur-
ing the short sample period, 2009-2012, is spatial rather than temporal. Still, that each parish is
observed in several time periods presents us with the possibility to remove all time-invariant unob-
served heterogeneity at the parish level. In a parish xed e¤ects specication, only the year-to-year
22The aid amount used for Future aid/capita is the amount in yet to be implemented projects averaged over the
period from the year after the survey until 2018, which is the latest end year of any future aid projects in the AidData
dataset.
23How the inow of foreign aid and the sectoral shares of agriculture, industry, and services evolve on the national
level over the sample period is shown in Figures B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B. Shocks or trends in these will be absorbed
by the control variables.
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change at the parish level is retained and the identifying variation no longer comes from the level,
but from the change in foreign aid. I exploit the temporal variation in aid in ongoing projects by
estimating the following parish xed e¤ects-specication:
Yipt = 1 Ongoing aid=capitapt + p + t
+d  t+  Xit + "ipt (Equation 2)
The key di¤erence compared to Equation 1 is that parish xed e¤ects (p) are included, so that
1 is estimated using the within-parish variation in aid only.
24 The interpretation of a positive
estimate of 1 obtained using Equation 2 is that if there is more aid coming into the local area this
year than the year before, the probability of observing the specic labor market outcome is higher.
In a lagged dependent model, the lag of the dependent variable will capture the inuence of
many of the underlying determinants, thus making the assumption of a causal e¤ect of aid more
plausible. The equation for the lagged dependent model:
Yipt = 1 Ongoing aid=capitapt +   Yip(t 1) + p + t
+d  t+  Xit + "ipt (Equation 3)
When the lag of the dependent variable is included, the model becomes dynamic.  is expected
to be positive and su¤er from Nickell bias. Note that the parish xed e¤ects are still included.
I also estimate an individual xed e¤ects model by estimating the following equation:
Yipt = 1 Ongoing aid=capitapt + i + t
+d  t+  Xit + "ipt (Equation 4)
When the individual xed e¤ects (i) are included they render the parish xed e¤ects (p)
redundant. For the standard errors to still be clustered at the parish level when Equation 4 is
estimated, the sample needs to be restricted to individuals that always live inside same parish.
4. Results
4.1 Main results
If foreign aid projects promote local structural transformation, people near aid projects will gradu-
ally come to work less on the household farm or with household livestock and work more in o¤-farm
activities. The evidence presented in Tables 1 and 2 shows that the exact opposite is taking place.
24The estimate of 1 will su¤er from attenuation bias. The data on aid commitment is not disaggregated by project
location and year. The yearly data is created by attributing equal shares of the total project amount to each project
location and year that is recorded for each project. While I believe that this is a reasonable approximation, there will
be a lot of noise, especially as the identication comes only from the temporal variation within each parish.
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While the positive estimate for Ongoing aid/capita in the rst column in Table 1 suggests that
people work more on the household farm in areas where more aid money is currently coming in, we
know it will su¤er from an omitted variables bias, i.e., capture factors that determine the location
of aid projects. We therefore relate it to the estimate for Future aid/capita in the same column.
The latter is signicantly negative, indicating that aid projects target areas where people tend to
work less, not more, in the traditional agricultural sector to begin with. The signicant F-test of
the di¤erence between these two estimates, which is the di¤erence-in-di¤erence type of measure,
conrms that there is a positive e¤ect on farm and livestock activity.25
Aid per capita is measured at the level of the parish. With the inclusion of parish xed e¤ects in
the specication in the next column, the identifying variation comes only from yearly changes within
parishes over the four consecutive years covered in the UNPS sample.26 Again, an inow of aid
money is found to encourage household farm and livestock activities. The qualitative result is the
same when I add the lag of the dependent variable, in the third column, and individual xed e¤ects,
in the fourth column. Comparing the results in the last three columns, the strongest magnitude is
found in the lagged dependent model, but even here the e¤ect is moderate. One standard deviation
increase in Ongoing aid/capita leads only to a 0:07 standard deviations increase in Work on Hh
farm, i.e, the number of hours worked on the household farm or with household livestock.
There would be less reason for concern if the positive e¤ect on hours worked on the household
farm did not coincide with fewer hours worked elseswhere, but the number of hours worked outside
the farm actually do fall in areas with ongoing aid projects, see Table 2. Total hours worked is
not a¤ected. The short term e¤ect of ongoing aid projects is therefore one of reversed structural
transformation. People living in areas more exposed to foreign aid activity tend to work fewer hours
o¤-farm and concentrate more on traditional agricultural activities.
[Table 1 about here]
[Table 2 about here]
The analysis here uses aggregated aid at the local level, regardless of identity of the donors or
of what sector the aid project targets. In Appendix D, I show that the results are not driven by aid
projects from any single group of donors or to any single aid sector alone, and are therefore unlikely
to capture that aid alleviates any particular binding constraint.
25Econometrically, it would be a problem if aid projects specically targeted areas with a trend from non-agricultural
to agricultural production, or vice versa. As I show in Appendix C that is not the case here.
26The parish is the level at which aid projects are matched to individuals. The parish is the fourth administrative
level (after district, counties, and sub-counties). Since respondents in the sample used here come from over 500
parishes, a high number of area xed e¤ects are estimated. Any time-invariant characteristic of the parishes that
could be driving both the local industrial structure and the allocation of aid projects are removed. Time-variant
heterogeneity is dealt with by the inclusion of year-by-month xed e¤ects and linear district time trends.
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4.2 Robustness
Before turning to alternative indicators of sectoral activity that can help to uncover the underlying
mechanisms and reveal what other activities those that ow into agriculture are abandoning, Table
3 is devoted to investigating the robustness of the positive short-term e¤ect of aid on hours worked
on the farm uncovered above. First, the set of control variables can be expanded considerably
without a¤ecting the results. Several of these additional control variables, presented in the notes to
the table, are likely to be endogenous, wherefore they do not belong in the baseline regressions.
In Uganda, the administrative level below the district is the county. In the baseline estimation,
district xed e¤ects and linear district time trends are included. There may important unobserved
heterogeneity in levels and trends between counties within each district, and this may bias the DD-
results. The results in the third line show that this is not the case since estimates are quite similar
when I replace the district-level indicators with their county-level counterparts. This interpretation
is further backed up by results I obtain when I rst omit all individuals living in counties that score
zero on both aid indicators (ongoing and future aid per capita) and where there also have been no
other aid projects for at least ve years, and then, in the next specication, omit individuals in
counties where at least one aid project has been completed during the last ve years.
In the baseline, the sample consists of individuals that by the UNPS are coded as usual members
of the household. The reason is that when the treatment is dened at the parish level, individuals
cannot be considered to be e¤ectively treated if they have lived elsewhere for most of the year. In
the sixth line, the sample is expanded to include household members that are either servants or
have not stayed with the household for at least six of the last twelve months. This does not a¤ect
the result.
Rural-urban migration is limited in Africa despite apparent potential gains for migrants.27 How
benecial migration out of rural areas is depends on the character or the area people migrate to.
Migration out of agriculture leads to faster poverty reduction if people move into secondary towns
or the rural nonfarm economy rather than into large cities (Christiaensen and Todo 2014). Foreign
aid could a¤ect migration patterns, and structural transformation is sometimes even confused with
internal rural-urban migration. The inow of aid to an area may either attract people or force them
to reallocate to other areas. Suppose that people move to a location where there was an ongoing
aid project in order to nd work. That does not mean that the aid project has no e¤ect on the
local economic structure, but it would a¤ect how one interprets the impact on the people that lived
there before. The results from the individual level xed e¤ects specication presented in Table 1
suggest that migration is not a fundamental underlying force. An alternative way to test whether
migration is a channel is to omit all persons that have migrated to their current location to either
look for work or for other economic reasons. Excluding all economic migrants does not change the
27For evidence on this migration, and a discussion on potential factors that could explain low migration, see de
Brauw et al. (2014).
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result in any meaningful way.
Not all individuals in the sample have a main income generating activity. Some are probably
too old to work, but a majority of those that do not work are attending school. There is also some
missing data on occupation or sector, or on number of hours worked, but that is on a reasonable
level.28 In the surveys, there are more general questions about economic activity that does not
refer to the main job or business. They include having any paid job, running any business, doing
any unpaid work in family businesses, or doing any paid or unpaid work on the household farm,
but less than one percent of those for which there is no data on the character of their main job
or business have some economic activity according to any of these measures. The sample does not
contain individuals that are too young to be a part of the (latent) work force. A majority of the
10-17 year olds in the sample are reported to have a main job or business, classied as an agriculture
occupation (55%), an industry occupation (2%) or a service occupation (2%).29 Hence, the young
cannot be excluded from the sample on basis of an argument that they are too young to work and
therefore not part of the workforce. For completeness, I omit all individuals younger than 18 years
old in a separate specication. The demographic prole of the sample means that a considerable
share of it is dropped. The qualitative results are not a¤ected.
In line nine, I use only one round of the UNPS. Note that while I here use only the rst of the
three UNPS rounds, the outcome in the lagged dependent specication in Table 1 is measured in
the last two rounds. The robustness of these results means that the baseline result is not an artefact
of some unusual or atypical event or action that for some unrelated reason also a¤ected the people
included in the sample between the survey rounds.
One should always consider the risk for selection bias caused by under- or oversampling of certain
groups. In the remained of Table 3, I omit individuals living in parishes that are small or large in
terms of either physical size, population, or population density, in order to show that the results are
not excessively inuenced by them. Finally, the mean and median number of individuals per parish
in our baseline sample is about 100, but some parishes are represented by few individuals. This
does not drive the results, since these hold also when parishes with few individuals in the sample
are omitted. My conclusion from the evidence presented above is that the positive short-term e¤ect
of aid on traditional agricultural activities is genuine and robust.
[Table 3 about here]
28 In Appendix E, I investigate the e¤ect on school attendance or having zero reported hours of work. There is no
e¤ect on the probability of zero hours worked, and only a small and not consistently signicant positive e¤ect on
probability of school attendance.
29Also in the lower part of this age spectrum (10-13 years of age), working is still very common. 53% have an
agriculture occupation, 1% an industry occupation, and 1% a service occupation.
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4.3 Sector and occupation
In this sub-section, I focus on more specic indicators of occupation and economic sector. The main
income generating activities are coded as belonging to one of the three broad economic sectors using
the ISIC-codes (goods or services produced), and to three broad classes of occupations using the
ISCO-codes (tasks or duties performed). A majority in the sample, or 55 or 56 percent in terms of
occupation or industry, are active in agriculture. The industrial sector is considerably smaller and
employs four or eight percent, while activity in the service sector is somewhat more common with a
share of ten or 13 percent, depending on denition. The dependent variables used in Tables 4 and
5 still capture the number of hours worked, but now by economic sector or occupation. The e¤ects
that foreign aid have on labor allocation across economic sectors and classes of occupations are
quite similar. More hours are worked in the agricultural sector and agricultural occupations, while
less hours are worked in the non-agricultural sector and non-agricultural occupations. The e¤ects
on industry or services are generally not robustly statistically signicant when these are studied in
isolation. For aid to help poor agriculturally dependent countries to walk in the footsteps of more
developed countries, people near aid projects should become more likely to work in the industrial
or service sectors and have industrial or service occupations. People should be less likely to have
agricultural occupations and work in the agricultural sector. The exact opposite is happening here.
Judging by the estimates in the third column in both Tables 4 and 5, people living in areas with
ongoing aid projects do not seem di¤erent in terms of non-agricultural activity when compared to
people living in areas that do not receive aid. However, as both the di¤erence-in-di¤erence type of
measure (Di¤erence: Ongoing - Future) and the lagged dependent estimates in the fourth column
reveal, this apparent similarity masks that aid projects are more likely to target areas where non-
agricultural activity is more common to begin with. The similarity of individuals in areas with and
without ongoing aid projects is the result of aid projects discouraging non-agricultural activities.
Aid not only halts the process of structural transformation, but reverses it.
[Table 4 about here]
[Table 5 about here]
In Appendix E, I discuss alternative and complementary indicators that reect the character of
the main income generating activity, in terms of skill-level and place of work. I show that foreign aid
has a negative impact on the skills required to perform the task that people do in their current main
income generating activity, and that it encourages a movement of people out of work in o¤-farm
self-employment or the operation of private rms. There is no e¤ect on unemployment.
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4.4 Wages and household expenditures
That foreign aid is associated with labor being reallocated from non-agricultural sectors into the
agricultural sector is clear from the evidence presented above. Following Rodrik (2013), one could
refer to this as perverse structural transformation. If it reects that aid supports agriculture, and
that more people therefore willingly work in the agricultural sector, one should be less concerned
about this development than if it reects that people shun other sectors because aid discourages
non-agricultural activities. In this subsection, evidence on the short-term e¤ects of aid on wages
and welfare at the sub-national level is presented. If aid supports agriculture, there should be a
positive relationship between the inow of aid and wages and welfare on average. If aid creates
conditions that are less favorable for industry and services, these relationships should instead be
negative. What the data shows is that both wages and household expenditures are negatively
a¤ected for people on average, and that these averages are driven by negative e¤ects on people in
non-agricultural sectors. There are no signicant e¤ects, neither positive nor negative, on people in
the agricultural sector.30
The focus in Table 6 is on the short-term e¤ects of foreign aid on wages, which are available
only for employees. The overall wage level is depressed when aid ows into the area, but the e¤ect
is modest. The estimate in the second column can be translated into a standardized beta-coe¢ cient
of  0:08. That is, a one standard deviation increase in ongoing aid per capita is associated with a
decrease in the average wage of less than a tenth of a standard deviation. The e¤ect is not large, but
it is also clearly not positive. The e¤ect is statistically signicant for workers in the non-agricultural
sectors, but not in the agricultural sector.
To evaluate the short-term e¤ects of foreign aid on welfare, I look at household expenditures per
household member. Foreign aid has a negative and signicant short-term e¤ect on this metric, see
Table 7. Again, the e¤ect is on the moderate side. Expressed as a standardized beta-coe¢ cient, the
results in the second columns is a low  0:03. Separating households by what sector the household
head is active in, I nd e¤ects similar to those uncovered for wages above. There is no e¤ect on
household expenditures for households where the head is active in the agricultural sector, but for
households where the head is active in the industrial or service sectors, expenditures are clearly
lower.
[Table 6 about here]
[Table 7 about here]
30The samples that can be used here are much smaller than the baseline sample, especially when I separately
employees and households by sector of activity. To use the lagged dependent specication would mean an additional
loss of one-third of these samples. I therefore opt for the parish xed e¤ects model rather than the lagged dependent
model.
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Wages and household expenditures are highest in the service sector and lowest in the agricul-
tural sector. Market real wages and household expenditures carry information about how pro-
ductive people are in their current occupation. The reallocation of labor from non-agricultural
sectors/occupations to agricultural sector/occupation in areas with ongoing aid projects is there-
fore an indication of a negative local short-term e¤ect on average productivity. I investigate this
further in Appendix F.
4.5 Discussion
Two broad trends can be observed. First, in areas where aid projects are implemented, people tend
to work more in agriculture and less in other sectors. Second, wages and household expenditures
fall in the non-agricultural sectors.
In principle, aid could support agriculture through, e.g., programs for fertilizer introduction,
funding of extension services, or investments in human capital formation or infrastructure. With
improved conditions for agriculture, one could expect a movement of people into that sector. That
aid has a negative impact on wages and household expenditures says that this explanation is at
odds with the data and that we need to look elsewhere.
For the revealed pattern to be explained by Dutch disease type of mechanisms (Corden and Neary
1982), one should observe an overall increase in the wage level, an expansion of the (internationally
or domestically) non-tradable sector, and a contraction of (internationally or domestically) tradable
sectors. Here average wages fall, and there no expansion of the service sector. Neither the rst nor
the second trend can thus be explained by mechanism of this type.
Uganda should have a comparative advantage in certain agricultural goods and a comparative
disadvantage in industrial production (manufacturing). The literature that examines the links
between trade liberalization, or openness, and structural transformation may provide insights. A
typical nding in this literature is that more openness is associated with positive or no e¤ects on
structural transformation, not negative e¤ects. For instance, Dodzin and Vamvakidis (2004) nd
that increased openness leads to a higher share of industrial value added, while Wacziarg andWallack
(2004) nd that there is no robust e¤ect on inter-sectoral labor shifts after liberalization episodes. If
foreign aid somehow integrated targeted areas more with the world market, the economic structure
should come to reect the pattern of comparative advantage. More specically, it should a¤ect
relative prices and encourage activities in the tradable sector in which the country has a comparative
advantage, and discourage activities in the tradable sector without comparative advantage. While
these two shifts are in line with what is observed here, specialization and trade should generate
positive, not negative, e¤ects on wages and welfare.
Classical explanations of long term structural transformation focus on either the demand side
(income e¤ects) or the supply side (relative price e¤ects). The rst of these says that as incomes
rise due to productivity growth in all sectors, non-homothetic preferences lead to a relative increase
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in demand for goods from non-agricultural sectors and relative fall in demand for goods from the
agricultural sector. By the same logic, reversed structural transformation requires a negative shock
to overall productivity followed by falling local incomes. Still, the e¤ects should be on relative
demand and not on absolute demand. There is no reason to expect an absolute increase in demand
for agricultural goods when the income level falls. The data does not show any negative e¤ects on
wages or welfare in the agricultural sector, so there is no consistent fall in incomes in all sectors in
areas receiving aid. The e¤ect on the averages comes entirely from falling wages and expenditures
in non-agricultural sectors. In the relative price-explanation for structural transformation, sectoral
TFP growth rate di¤erences lead to changes in relative prices. Over time, labor shifts to the sector
with slower TFP-growth (a higher relative price). In line with this reasoning, faster TFP growth in
non-agricultural sectors would predict the rst main trend, but there should not be falling wages
and welfare for people active in those sectors. Falling TFP in agriculture could also explain the rst
trend, but that would not lead to falling wages in other sectors.
More data is needed to pinpoint the exact mechanism, and it is worth to consider that when
implementing aid projects on the ground, donors a¤ect both local supply and local demand. A
possible mechanism deserving further investigation is whether there is crowding out of local suppliers
of non-agricultural goods and services. Some projects directly aim to supply more or better roads,
school buildings, health centers, etc. Projects with other aims can still end up a¤ecting supply
in the same direction. For instance, in order to improve access to electricity, local roads may
need to improved rst. Also in areas where production is small-scale and labor-intensive, and
products and services are of relatively poor quality, some necessary construction and maintenance
of roads and buildings is often already taking place. Where donors engage non-local producers
in the implementation process they may therefore crowd out demand for goods and services from
local suppliers. If so, communities may both benet from access to better roads, schools, and health
centers, and experience a short-term negative shock to local producers of non-agricultural goods and
services. Lower demand implies lower protability in local non-agricultural sectors and some rms
may down-size or close. As a response to lower labor demand and a lower relative compensation,
workers should seek employment elsewhere. Additionally, as aid projects are implemented, local
demand for agricultural products can increase. Donors are more likely to bring in physical capital
and technical expertise that crowd out local non-agricultural supply than food or other agricultural
products consumed by the people directly active in the projects. If there is an increase in demand
for products from the agricultural sector, protability in the sector can increase initially. New farms
may open up and production in already existing farms expand. There could be more hours worked
in the sector. Labor attracted to the sector will work on increasingly marginal land, and lower
marginal yields imply that the net e¤ect on wages or household expenditures in the agricultural
sector is not necessarily positive.
In sum, crowding out of supply in industry and services combined with a relative increase in
demand in agriculture could explain not only the observed pattern of labor reallocation and hours
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worked, but also the e¤ects on wages and welfare.
5. Concluding remarks
The process of structural transformation refers to the reallocation of labor from low-productivity to
high-productivity sectors. The question asked here is if the inow of foreign aid money speeds up or
reverses this process. In the rst part of the paper, I review the related literature on aid-e¤ectiveness
and structural transformation. The e¤ects found on the national level range from negative in the
short term, to positive in the short and long term. There are no previous systematic studies on the
e¤ects of foreign aid on structural transformation on the sub-national level.
The data used in the empirical exercise links georeferenced aid projects to individual-level panel
data with information about labor allocation by sectors in Uganda. Since the matching is done on
the lowest administrative level possible, only aid projects with high precision in the point coordinates
are used. The empirical results are obtained using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence type of estimator and
more traditional models with xed e¤ects and lagged dependent variables.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the evidence presented. First, aid projects appear
to be located in areas that are relatively more developed to begin with. Second, areas where aid
projects are being implemented appear to become, on several metrics, less developed. Third, there
is robust evidence that the local short-term e¤ect of foreign aid is that people work more in unskilled
agricultural activities and fewer hours outside the farm. Fourth, aid has a negative e¤ect on wages
and household expenditures. Overall, aid has a negative short-term e¤ect on the local economic
structure by depressing modern sectors and encouraging the traditional agricultural sector. Whether
this e¤ect lingers on once the aid projects are nished is a topic for future research.
A stylized fact of development is that the share of agriculture goes down as countries leave
poverty and grow richer. In recent decades, though, this process of structural transformation has
sometimes been going backwards in Africa. That foreign aid leads to an increase in farm activity
should not come as surprise, given the strong donor focus on smallholder agriculture. Collier and
Dercon (2014) argue that this focus is based on the wrong model of economic growth, and that
for poverty in Africa to be reduced the number of farmers should go down, not up. The evidence
presented in this paper supports the idea that the inow of foreign aid is partly to blame for the lack
of progress in terms of structural transformation. To rmly put this process back on track, donors
need to focus more on the development of high-productivity activities and more seriously consider
the extent to which their activities on the ground crowd out struggling enterprises in sectors with
better dynamic properties.
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Appendix
A. Variable descriptions and summary statistics
[Table A.1 about here]
[Table A.2 about here]
B. Trends in foreign aid and sectoral shares in Uganda
[Figure B.1 about here]
[Figure B.2 about here]
C. Pre-trends
The results from DD-specications suggest that aid projects tend to target areas where people
work more in non-agriculture and less in agriculture, but when the projects are being implemented,
people move out of non-agriculture and into agriculture. Hence, aid contributes to the reversal of
the structural transformation process. This interpretation rests on the assumption that aid projects
are not specically targeting parishes that already have a trend from non-agricultural to agricultural
production. In order to test whether this is the case, I estimate the following specication:
Ongoing aid=capitat+1;t = 1 Yt;t 1 + d + t
+d  t+  Xt 1 + "pt (Equation C.1)
The unit of observations is the parish, and all variables used are calculated as the weighted mean
for each parish. Yt;t 1 represents changes the labor market indicator from year t   1 to year t,
and the dependent variable captures changes in Ongoing aid/capita from year t to year t+ 1. The
vector X contains parish level controls including the parish mean of the individual level controls.
All control variables represent year t 1, except for the district time trends and year-by-month xed
e¤ects which represent year t. Table C.1 collects the results. The estimates show that less, not
more, aid goes to parishes with a trend from non-agricultural to agricultural production (in terms
of parish average in hours worked by sector), but they are not statistically signicant. Changes in
the labor market indicators from t  1 to t cannot explain changes in aid from t to t+ 1.
[Table C.1 about here]
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D. Disaggregated aid
Any disaggregation of aid into aid from di¤erent donors makes the identication of a causal e¤ect
in the di¤erence-in-di¤erence type of estimation less likely, since one must then assume that aid
from di¤erent donors have di¤erent determinants, and since the control group no longer will consist
of people in areas where there has been, are, or will be no aid projects (from other donors). The
parish xed xed e¤ects estimations rely on yearly within-parish variation in aid and is not subject
to these particular concerns. I prefer the parish xed e¤ects model to the lagged dependent model
in this context also since when aid is disaggregated into aid from di¤erent donors, fewer parishes
will have positive amounts of aid per capita and to retain the sample size becomes more important
here. For these reasons, the parish xed e¤ects results are presented along with DD-results.
First, I separate aid projects into aid from three di¤erent donor classes;Western bilateral donors,
Multilateral donors, and Mixed, i.e., projects that are joint between Western bilateral and Multilat-
eral donors. China has too few projects to be included as a separate class. The results for projects
from Western bilateral donors and from joint aid projects are similar to what is found for aid in
general, while there is no e¤ect (on this metric) of multilateral projects.
[Table D.1 about here]
Next, total aid is disaggregated into aid with di¤erent purposes, or to di¤erent aid sectors.
The econometric issues discussed above are relevant here as well. Aid to infrastructure and aid to
agriculture are the only aid types for which the e¤ects are consistently statistically signicant in both
the DD and Parish FE estimations. Aid to human capital has similar e¤ects, but the di¤erence is
not signicant in the DD estimation. Evidently, the e¤ect of aggregated aid on agricultural activity,
discussed in the main text, is not just capturing an e¤ect from aid to agriculture as such.
The results from the disaggregated analyses show that the main results are not due to the e¤ect
of aid from any single class of donors or to any particular sector alone. It is therefore unlikely that
they capture that aid projects alleviates any particular binding constraint. Note that what could
not explain the results in this subsection is that aid projects from di¤erent donors or to di¤erent
sectors are of di¤erent size, since the indicators reect the per capita amount of aid.
[Table D.2 about here]
E. Skill-level, place of work, unemployment, and school attendance
In Table 4, the ISCO-code of the main income generating activity is used to construct indicators
of three types of occupations. The ISCO-code is a classication of the tasks and duties performed,
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and consequently a reection of the skills required in these occupations. Following Dorosh and
Thurlow (2014), I use the ISCO-code to classify occupations as unskilled or skilled, see Table A.2
for details.31 From this complementary perspective on the character of peoples occupations, the
estimates in Table E.1, though not always statistically signicant, suggest that foreign aid has a
negative impact on the skills required to perform the task that people do. More specically, there
is a positive e¤ect on the number of hours worked in unskilled occupations, and a negative e¤ect
on hours worked in skilled occupations. The local economy becomes less advanced, at least in the
short term.
[Table E.1 about here]
Standard categories used in the structural transformation literature are in Table E.2 comple-
mented with indicators informative on related aspects of the economic structure. In the process
to become a more developed economy, people should move out of traditional forms of employment
on the household farm and into more modern forms of employment or work places. In Table E.2,
the evidence shows that foreign aid reverses this development process by encouraging a movement
of people out of work in o¤-farm self-employment or managing a business. There is no e¤ect on
o¤-farm employment, nor on hours worked in the government or in other private households.
[Table E.2 about here]
True unemployment is very rare in this sample, and there is no indication that aid a¤ects the
probability of being unemployed, see Table E.3. Likewise, there is no e¤ect on the probability of
reporting zero hours worked. There is a weak and marginally signicant negative e¤ect of aid on the
probability of attending school, but only in the LD-specication. The e¤ects on school attendance,
unemployment, and zero hours worked (all dummy indicators) are not large enough to explain why
more hours are worked in agriculture in areas with ongoing aid projects.
[Table E.3 about here]
31 In interpreting the results, it is worth noting that elementary occupations, which about six percent of the
individuals in the sample have, are included in the group of industrial occupations. The di¤erence between an
agricultural occupation and an unskilled occupation is that the latter include individuals that have an elementary
occupation. Similarly, the skilled occupations are those whose main tasks or duties also mean that they are coded as
having either a service occupation or an industrial occupation, net of those with an elementary occupation.
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F. Productivity
[Table F.1 about here]
People earn more if they are employed in the industrial sector than if they are employed in the
agricultural sector, and even more if they are employed in the service sector, see Table F.1. This
suggests that the main results reect how an inow of aid is associated with people shifting into
less productive occupations, at least in the short term.
Under the assumption that market compensation for a person with a certain occupation is a
signal of how productive a person with that occupation is, I can use observed wages (for employed
workers) and household expenditures (for households where the head has a certain occupation) in
areas without completed or ongoing aid projects to construct two measures of productivity. There
are nine occupational classes (based on ISCO-codes): 1. Legislators, senior o¢ cials, managers and
administrators, 2. Professionals (graduates), 3. Associate professionals (diploma and certicate
holders), 4. Clerks, 5. Service workers, shop and market sales workers, 6. Agricultural or shery
workers, 7. Craft and related workers, 8. Plant, machine operators and assemblers, and 9. Elemen-
tary occupations. For each occupational class, I extract the weighted average wage and household
expenditures. I then assign each individual or household head a specic value depending on their
occupation.
The wage-based and the expenditure-based versions of the indicators of productivity of occupa-
tion are used as dependent variables in Table F.2. To the extent that the assumption that market
compensation carry information about how productive people are in their current occupation, the
results indicate that ongoing aid projects are associated with people shifting into less productive
occupations.
[Table F.2 about here]
27
 Figure 1. Aid projects and household locations in Uganda. 
 
 
 
 Figure B.1 Foreign aid in Uganda 2009-2015 
Notes: The sum of total ODA disbursed, net of debt relief, from all donors tracked in the OECD-DAC 
reporting system. The index set to 100 in year 2009. Source of data: OECD-DAC (2017). 
 
Figure B.2 Economic sectors in Uganda 2009-2016 
Notes: The figures represent value added of agriculture, industry, services, and non-agriculture (the sum 
of industry and services), all in percent of GDP. Source of data: WDI (2018). 
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Agriculture Industry
Services Non-Agriculture
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification: DD Parish FE LD FE
Ongoing aid/capita 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.06**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Future aid/capita -0.07**
(0.03)
Lag of Work on Hh farm 0.25***
(0.01)
Difference: Ongoing - Future 0.13
F-test of difference 16.27***
F-test of difference: p-value 0.000
Parish fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 24,986 24,986 15,024 24,039
R2 0.22 0.28 0.34 0.06
Table 1. Foreign aid and structural transformation
Dependent variable: Work on Hh farm
Notes:
Estimated with OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered at the parish level, in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
All specifications include the following control variables. Sex, age and age-squared, ethnic group dummies, ethnic group-
by-gender-dummies, urban dummy, a gender-by-urban dummy, log of population density in year 2000, log of 1 + light 
emission in year 2000, log of parish area, log of parish population, log of annual mean temperature, log of annual 
precipitation, log of distance to market, log of distance to headquarters of district of residence, log of distance to nearest 
land border crossing, log of distance to nearest major road, log of distance to nearest population center, log of elevation, 
log of mean temperature of wettest quarter, log of 1+ percent agriculture within 1 km buffer, log of precipitation of wettest 
quarter, log of 1 + slope, district fixed effects (parish fixed effects in Columns 2-4), linear district time trends, and year-by-
month fixed effects. Constants are included the specifications but not reported. In Column 4, the sample is restricted to 
individuals for which the reported coordinates fall within the same parish in all waves the individual is included, and the 
within-R2 is reported. See the main text and Table A.2 for variable descriptions and data sources.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 
Specification: DD LD DD LD
Ongoing aid/capita -0.03 -0.10** 0.04 0.02
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06)
Future aid/capita 0.08*** 0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Lag of dependent variable 0.36*** 0.21***
(0.02) (0.01)
Difference: Ongoing - Future -0.11 0.02
F-test of difference 10.65*** 0.53
F-test of difference: p-value 0.001 0.468
Parish fixed effects Yes Yes
N 24,986 15,024 24,986 15,024
R2 0.27 0.42 0.24 0.33
Notes:
Work outside Hh 
farm
Any work
Estimated with OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered at the parish level, in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are listed in the notes to 
Table 1.  See the main text and Table A.2 in the appendix for details.
Table 2. Hours worked outside the Hh farm and total hours worked
Dependent variable: Work on 
Hh farm
Diff.: 
Ongoing 
- Future
F-test 
of diff.
P-value 
of F-
test
N R 2
(1) DD 0.07*** (0.02) -0.07** (0.03) 0.13 16.27 0.000 24,986 0.22
LD 0.12*** (0.04) 15,024 0.34
(2) DD 0.07*** (0.02) -0.05* (0.03) 0.12 12.70 0.000 24,563 0.24
LD 0.10*** (0.04) 14,957 0.35
(3) DD 0.08*** (0.02) -0.07** (0.03) 0.15 23.29 0.000 24,986 0.24
LD 0.14*** (0.04) 15,024 0.35
(4) DD 0.07*** (0.02) -0.06** (0.03) 0.13 16.15 0.000 22,355 0.23
LD 0.12*** (0.04) 13,447 0.35
(5) DD 0.09*** (0.02) -0.05 (0.03) 0.13 11.44 0.001 16,080 0.18
LD 0.12** (0.05) 8,855 0.31
(6) DD 0.06*** (0.02) -0.06** (0.03) 0.13 12.77 0.000 28,007 0.21
LD 0.15*** (0.04) 16,973 0.33
(7) DD 0.07*** (0.02) -0.08*** (0.03) 0.15 20.13 0.000 22,098 0.21
LD 0.17*** (0.07) 13,269 0.33
(8) DD 0.08*** (0.02) -0.10** (0.04) 0.18 15.43 0.000 16,052 0.26
LD 0.08** (0.04) 9,704 0.40
(9) DD 0.11*** (0.03) -0.09** (0.04) 0.20 14.53 0.000 9,589 0.24
(10) DD 0.07*** (0.02) -0.07** (0.03) 0.13 18.14 0.000 22,423 0.23
LD 0.13*** (0.04) 13,487 0.35
(11) DD 0.07*** (0.02) -0.05* (0.03) 0.13 13.86 0.000 22,704 0.19
LD 0.12*** (0.04) 13,743 0.32
(12) DD 0.09*** (0.02) -0.06** (0.03) 0.15 19.76 0.000 22,503 0.19
LD 0.13*** (0.05) 13,534 0.32
(13) DD 0.08*** (0.02) -0.05* (0.03) 0.13 16.27 0.000 22,846 0.22
LD 0.13*** (0.04) 13,864 0.34
(14) DD 0.08*** (0.02) -0.06* (0.03) 0.14 15.38 0.000 22,751 0.17
LD 0.13*** (0.05) 13,766 0.30
(15) DD 0.07*** (0.02) -0.04* (0.03) 0.11 13.68 0.000 22,421 0.23
LD 0.13*** (0.04) 13,532 0.35
(16) DD 0.06*** (0.02) -0.07** (0.03) 0.13 13.78 0.000 23,915 0.22
LD 0.14*** (0.04) 14,375 0.32
Notes:
Estimated with OLS using Equations 1 (DD ) and 3 (LD ). Robust standard errors, clustered at the parish level, in parentheses, *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Additional control variables included in (2) are the following. Individual level: married 
monogamously, married polygamously, divorced, widow/-er, finished primary school level 3, finished secondary school level 3, 
can read and write, relation to household head (separate dummies for head, spouse, son/daughter, grand child, parent of head or 
spouse, sister/brother of head or spouse, nephew/niece, other relatives, non-relative, and other (not servant)); Household level: 
adult equivalents, male-headed household, household head finished primary school level 3, household head finished secondary 
school level 3, and household head can read and write. Control variables that are always included are listed in the notes to Table 
1. See the main text and Table A.2 in the appendix for details. 
Ongoing 
aid/capita Future aid/capita
Parishes with large physical 
size (>75km2) omitted
Only one wave (2009/2010) 
used
Economic migrants excluded
Parishes with small physical 
size (<3.5 km2) omitted 
Parishes with large 
populations (>15 000 people) 
omitted
Parishes with small 
populations (<2500 people) 
omitted
Parishes with high population 
density (>3000 persons/km2) 
omitted
Parishes with low population 
density (<100 persons/km2) 
omitted
Parishes with few individuals 
included in the baseline 
sample (<15 individuals) 
omitted
All individuals from age 18 
instead of age 10 included
Table 3. Robustness
County fixed effects and 
trends (instead of district fixed 
effects and trends)
Only individuals in counties 
that have received (the last 
five years), now recieve, or 
will recieve aid
Only individuals in counties 
that have not recieved aid 
before (the last five years)
All household members 
included (including servants 
and those that have not stayed 
with the household for at least 
six of the last twelve months)
Additional control variables 
included
Baseline (Table 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: 
Specification: DD LD DD LD DD LD DD LD
Ongoing aid/capita 0.05*** 0.15*** -0.02 -0.14*** -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09**
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
Future aid/capita -0.06* 0.07** 0.06*** 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Lag of dependent variable 0.25*** 0.42*** 0.37*** 0.44***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Difference: Ongoing - Future 0.11 -0.09 -0.07 -0.03
F-test of difference 9.83*** 7.41*** 9.09*** 0.76
F-test of difference: p-value 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.384
Parish fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 24,986 15,024 24,986 15,024 24,986 15,024 24,986 15,024
R2 0.24 0.36 0.26 0.45 0.06 0.26 0.22 0.44
Notes:
Table 4. Economic sector
Agricultural sector Non-agricultural 
sector
Industrial sector Service sector
Estimated with OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered at the parish level, in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables 
are listed in the notes to Table 1. See the main text and Table A.2 in the appendix for details. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: 
Specification: DD LD DD LD DD LD DD LD
Ongoing aid/capita 0.06*** 0.12*** -0.02 -0.09** 0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
Future aid/capita -0.06** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Lag of dependent variable 0.25*** 0.41*** 0.31*** 0.40***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Difference: Ongoing - Future 0.12 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04
F-test of difference 14.41*** 9.10*** 4.05** 1.71
F-test of difference: p-value 0.000 0.003 0.045 0.191
Parish fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 24,986 15,024 24,986 15,024 24,986 15,024 24,986 15,024
R2 0.23 0.36 0.27 0.45 0.14 0.29 0.16 0.37
Notes:
Industrial 
occupation
Service occupation
Estimated with OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered at the parish level, in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control 
variables are listed in the notes to Table 1. See the main text and Table A.2 in the appendix for details. 
Table 5. Occupation
Agricultural 
occupation
Non-agricultural 
occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sector:
Specification: DD Parish FE DD Parish FE DD Parish FE
Ongoing aid/capita -0.09* -0.12* 0.00 -0.04 -0.12** -0.10*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06)
Future aid/capita 0.08 0.06 0.05
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
Difference: Ongoing - Future -0.17 -0.06 -0.17
F-test of difference 7.82*** 0.33 6.84***
F-test of difference: p-value 0.005 0.566 0.009
Parish fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 2,176 2,176 425 425 1,633 1,633
R2 0.36 0.56 0.61 0.84 0.29 0.52
Notes:
Estimated with OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered at the parish level, in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Control variables as in Table 1, see notes to that table, with the exeption that the ethnic group dummies and linear district 
time trends are omitted. See the main text and Table A.2 in the appendix for details. 
Table 6. Wages
Dependent variable: Wage
Non-agriculturalAgriculturalAny
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sector:
Specification: DD Parish FE DD Parish FE DD Parish FE
Ongoing aid/capita -0.04* -0.04* -0.00 -0.00 -0.07*** -0.10***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
Future aid/capita 0.04 0.01 0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Difference: Ongoing - Future -0.08 -0.01 -0.12
F-test of difference 5.16** 0.07 7.10***
F-test of difference: p-value 0.024 0.789 0.008
Parish fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 6,319 6,319 3,567 3,567 2,220 2,220
R2 0.39 0.52 0.31 0.44 0.40 0.60
Notes:
Estimated with OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered at the parish level, in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. The dependent variables is household expenditures per adult equivalent. The sample consists of all 
household heads in the sample that are not more than 65 years old. Control variables are listed in the notes to Table 
1. See the main text and Table A.2 in the appendix for details. 
Table 7. Household expenditures
Dependent variable: Household expenditures
Any Agricultural Non-agricultural
N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Age 27007 29.73 18.07 10 101
Agricultural occupation 27025 1.31 1.43 0 4.83
Agricultural sector 27025 1.35 1.44 0 4.83
Any work 27025 1.93 1.53 0 5.04
Attending school 26956 0.36 0.48 0 1
Industrial occupation 27025 0.27 0.95 0 4.82
Industrial sector 27025 0.11 0.61 0 4.61
Male 27025 0.48 0.50 0 1
Non-agricultural occupation 27025 0.61 1.38 0 5.04
Non-agricultural sector 27025 0.55 1.33 0 5.04
Off-farm employment 27025 0.31 1.03 0 4.82
Off-farm self-employment 27025 0.33 1.05 0 5.04
Running a business 27025 0.13 0.34 0 1
Service occupation 27025 0.34 1.09 0 5.04
Service sector 27025 0.44 1.22 0 5.04
Skilled occupation 27025 0.43 1.20 0 5.04
Unemployment 27025 0.01 0.08 0 1
Unskilled occupation 27025 1.49 1.48 0 4.83
Wage 2359 10.12 1.20 1.26 16.74
Work in government 27025 0.06 0.48 0 4.68
Work in other household 27025 0.21 0.82 0 4.73
Work on Hh farm 27025 1.21 1.41 0 4.52
Work outside Hh farm 27025 0.72 1.45 0 5.04
Zero hours worked 27025 0.09 0.29 0 1
Annual mean temperature 27022 5.39 0.08 5 5.58
Annual precipitation 27022 7.11 0.16 6.53 7.62
Distance to district administration centre 27022 2.60 1.00 -2.52 5.31
Distance to land border crossing 27022 4.33 0.88 -3.51 5.34
Distance to major road 27001 1.21 1.58 -9.21 3.73
Distance to nearest market 27022 3.06 1.00 -2.52 4.76
Distance to population centre 27022 2.65 1.07 -2.52 4.63
Elevation 27022 7.10 0.18 6.43 7.78
Household expenditures 7706 11.3 0.84 3.74 15.87
Light emission in 2000 27025 0.53 1.15 0 4.16
Mean temperature of wettest quarter 27022 5.38 0.07 5 5.54
Percent agriculture within 1 km 27022 3.55 0.91 0 4.62
Population density in 2000 26850 5.49 1.30 1.86 8.97
Precipitation of wettest quarter 27022 6.11 0.17 5.63 6.79
Slope 27022 1.84 0.66 0 3.92
Urban area 27025 0.21 0.41 0 1
Future aid/capita 26769 0.05 0.40 0 5.75
Ongoing aid/capita 26769 0.16 0.69 0 5.96
Parish area (log) 27025 2.97 1.41 -1.48 10.25
Parish population 26769 8.73 0.76 5.51 11.2
Notes:
Panel A: Individual level
Table A.1. Summary statistics
Panel B: Household level
Panel C: Parish level
In the table are unweighted figures for individuals that are usual, non-servant, members of the household, at least 
ten years old, who live in a parish without a completed aid project, and for which there is information about 
ethnic group. For variable descriptions, see the main text and Table A.2 in the appendix.
Variable Description
Age Age in years. Source: UNPS (2017).
Agricultural 
occupation
Natural log of 1 + number of hours worked in an agricultural occupation, i.e., the 
ISCO-code corresponds to Agricultural or Fishery workers. Source: UNPS (2017).
Agricultural sector Natural log of 1 + number of hours worked in the agricultural sector, i.e., the ISIC-
code corresponds to Agriculture, hunting & forestry, or Fishing. Source: UNPS 
(2017).
Attending school Dummy for attending school. Source: UNPS (2017).
Household 
expenditures
Natural log of total household consumption expenditures, per adult equivalent. 
Expenditures are sum of the value of items purchased or home produced. Items 
included are (i) Food, Beverage, and Tobacco, (ii) Non-Durable Goods and Frequently 
Purchased Services, and (iii) Semi-Durable Goods and Durable Goods and Service. 
Since recall periods are seven days before survey for (i), 30 days for (2), and 365 days 
for (3), the values are rescaled to a common 30 day period. Values are in Ugandan 
Shilling (2010) and deflated using the national consumer price index. Source: UNPS 
(2017) and WDI (2018).
Hours worked Natural log of 1 + number of hours worked in the main income generating activity 
during the week before the survey. Source: UNPS (2017).
Industrial 
occupation
Natural log of 1 + number of hours worked in an industrial occupation, i.e., the ISCO-
code corresponds to Craft and related workers, Plant, machine operators and 
assemblers, or Elementary occupations. Source: UNPS (2017).
Industrial sector Natural log of 1 + number of hours worked in the industrial sector, i.e., the ISIC-code 
corresponds to Mining and quarrying, Manufacturing, Electricity, gas & water supply, 
or Construction. Source: UNPS (2017).
Male Dummy for being male. Source: UNPS (2017).
Off-farm self-
employment
Natural log of 1 + number of hours worked if working as an own-account worker, 
rather than working for someone else for pay, being an employer, helping without pay 
in a household business, being an apprentice, or working on the household farm or 
with household livestock. Source: UNPS (2017).
Off-farm 
employment
Natural log of 1 + number of hours worked for someone else for pay, rather than being 
an own-account worker, being an employer, helping without pay in a household 
business, being an apprentice, or working on the household farm or with household 
livestock. Source: UNPS (2017).
Productivity of 
occupation 
(expenditure-based)
Natural log of the real total household expendiures for each occupational class. 
Calculated as the weighted average for households within that specific occupational 
class living in parish without completed or ongoing aid projects. The occupational 
classes, which are based on the ISCO-codes, are: 1. Legislators, Senior officials, 
Managers and administrators, 2. Professionals (graduates), 3. Associate professionals 
(diploma and certificate holders), 4. Clerks, 5. Service workers, shop and market sales 
workers, 6. Agricultural or Fishery workers, 7. Craft and related workers, 8. Plant, 
machine operators and assemblers, and 9. Elementary occupations. Source: UNPS 
(2017) and WDI (2018).
Table A.2. Variable descriptions
Panel A: Individual level
Productivity of 
occupation (wage-
based)
Natural log of the real market wage for each occupational class. The real market wage 
in each occupational class is calculated as the weighted average of the cash wage (see 
Wage) for individuals within that specific occupational class working for either the 
national or local government or for a private enterprise (including commercial banks) 
living in a parish without completed or ongoing aid projects. The occupational classes, 
which are based on the ISCO-codes, are: 1. Legislators, Senior officials, Managers and 
administrators, 2. Professionals (graduates), 3. Associate professionals (diploma and 
certificate holders), 4. Clerks, 5. Service workers, shop and market sales workers, 6. 
Agricultural or Fishery workers, 7. Craft and related workers, 8. Plant, machine 
operators and assemblers, and 9. Elementary occupations. Source: UNPS (2017) and 
WDI (2018).
Running a business Equal to one if ran a business during the week before the survey. Source: UNPS 
(2017). 
Service occupation Natural log of 1 + number of hours worked in an service occupation, i.e., the ISCO-
code corresponds to Legislators, Senior officials, Managers and administrators, 
Professionals (graduates), Associate professionals (diploma and certificate holders), 
Clerks, or Service workers, shop and market sales workers. Source: UNPS (2017). 
Service sector Natural log of 1 + number of hours worked in the service sector, i.e., the ISIC-code 
corresponds to Sale, maintanance, and repair, of motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods, Hotels and restaurants,  Transport, storage and 
communications,  Financial intermediation, Real estate, renting and business 
activities, Public administration and defence (compulsory social security),  Education, 
Health and social work, or Other community, social and personal service activities. 
Source: UNPS (2017).
Skilled Natural log of 1 + number of hours worked in a skilled occupation, i.e., the ISCO-code 
corresponds to Legislators, Senior officials, Managers and administrators, 
Professionals (graduates), Associate professionals (diploma and certificate holders), 
Clerks, Service workers, shop and market sales workers, Craft and related workers, or 
Plant, machine operators and assemblers. Source: UNPS (2017).
Unemployment Dummy for being unemployed. Source: UNPS (2017).
Unskilled Natural log of 1 + number of hours worked in a skilled occupation, i.e., the ISCO-code 
corresponds to Agricultural or Fishery workers, or Elementary occupations. Source: 
UNPS (2017).
Wage Natural log of the cash wage from the main income generating activity during the 
week before the survey for individuals for which this is a non-zero amount. Wages are 
in Ugandan Shillings (2010) and deflated using the national consumer price index. 
Source: UNPS (2017) and WDI (2018).
Work in 
Government
Natural log of 1 + number of hours worked in national government, local government, 
or government controlled business. Source: UNPS (2017).
Work in Other 
household
Natural log of 1 + number of hours worked in a private household. Source: UNPS 
(2017).
Work on Hh farm Natural log of 1 + number of hours worked if the main income generating activity 
during the week before the survey was working on Hh farm or with Hh livestock. 
Source: UNPS (2017).
Work outside Hh 
farm
Natural log of 1 + number of hours worked if the main income generating activity 
during the week before the survey was not working on Hh farm or with Hh livestock. 
Source: UNPS (2017).
Zero hours worked Dummy for reporting zero hours worked. Source: UNPS (2017).
Annual mean 
temperature
Natural log of annual mean temperature (degrees celsius * 10). Source: UNPS (2017).
Annual 
precipitation
Natural log of annual precipitation (mm). Source: UNPS (2017).
Distance to district 
administration 
centre
Natural log of distance to headquarters of district of residence (km). Source: UNPS 
(2017).
Distance to market Natural log of distance to nearest market (km). Source: UNPS (2017).
Distance to land 
border crossing
Natural log of distance to nearest land border crossing (km). Source: UNPS (2017).
Distance to major 
road
Natural log of distance to nearest major road (km). Source: UNPS (2017).
Distance to 
population centre
Natural log of distance to nearest population center with >20,000 inhabitants (km). 
Source: UNPS (2017).
Elevation Natural log of elevation (km). Source: UNPS (2017).
Light in year 2000 Natural log of 1+ light emission in year 2000. Source: NOAA (2017).
Mean temperature 
of wettest quarter
Natural log of mean temperature of wettest quarter (degrees celsius * 10). Source: 
UNPS (2017).
Percent agriculture 
within 1km
Percent agriculture within 1 km buffer. Source: UNPS (2017).
Population density 
in year 2000
Natural log of population density in year 2000. Source: GPW (2017).
Precipitation of 
wettest quarter
Natural log of 1+ precipitation of wettest quarter (mm). Source: UNPS (2017).
Slope Slope in percent. Source: UNPS (2017).
Urban area Dummy for urban area. Source: UNPS (2017).
Future aid/capita Natural log of 1 + aid amount in future, but not ongoing or completed, aid projects, 
per capita, in the household's parish. Future aid projects are projects that started no 
earlier than the year after the survey. Household coordinates from UNPS (2017) and 
aid projects with precision code 1 or 2 from AidData (2017). Parish boundaries from 
RCMRD (2017) and population from GPW (2017).
Ongoing aid/capita Natural log of 1 + aid amount in ongoing projects, per capita, in the household's 
parish. Ongoing aid-projects are projects that had a start no later than the year of the 
survey and had an end date not prior to the year of survey. Household coordinates 
from UNPS (2017) and aid projects with precision code 1 or 2from AidData (2017). 
Parish boundaries from RCMRD (2017) and population from GPW (2017).
Parish area Natural log of parish area (km). Parish boundaries from RCMRD (2017).
Parish population Natural log of parish population in the year prior to each survey. Parish boundaries 
from RCMRD (2017) and population from GPW (2017).
Panel B: Household level
Panel C: Parish level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ΔWork on Hh farmt,t-1 -0.00
(0.02)
ΔWork outside Hh farmt,t-1 -0.01
(0.03)
ΔAgricultural sectort,t-1 -0.01
(0.02)
ΔNon-agricultural sectort,t-1 -0.01
(0.04)
ΔAgricultural occupationt,t-1 -0.00
(0.03)
ΔNon-agricultural occupationt,t- -0.01
(0.03)
ΔWaget,t-1 -0.01
(0.01)
ΔHousehold expenditurest,t-1 -0.04
(0.03)
N 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 559
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20
Notes:
Table C.1. Pre-trends
Dependent variable: ΔOngoing aid/capita t+1,t
Estimated with OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The unit of observations is the parish. All variables are calculated as the weighted mean for 
each parish. The dependent variable captures changes in the parish mean from year t  to year t+1  and the 
reported independent variables capture changes in the parish mean from year t-1  to year t . The control variables 
listed in Table 1 that are not included here are the ethnic group dummies, the ethnic group-by-gender dummies, 
and the district trends. All control variables represent year t-1 , except for the year-by-month fixed effects which 
represent year t . See the main text and Table A.2 for variable descriptions and data sources.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Donor class:
Specification: DD
Parish 
FE DD
Parish 
FE DD
Parish 
FE
Ongoing aid/capita 0.07** 0.12*** 0.08** -0.03 0.06** 0.10***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Future aid/capita -0.11 0.04 -0.07***
(0.08) (0.03) (0.02)
Difference: Ongoing - Future 0.18 0.04 0.13
F-test of difference 6.57** 0.94 12.21***
F-test of difference: p-value 0.011 0.334 0.001
Parish fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 24,986 24,986 24,986 24,986 24,986 24,986
R2 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.28
Notes:
Estimated with OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered at the parish level, in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Donor classes are: Western bilateral, if project by a single OECD- or Western country. 
Multilateral, if project by multilateral donor(s) such as the World Bank (IDA or IBRD), the EU, or the UN 
only. Mixed, if project by both Western bilateral and Multilateral. Control variables are listed in the notes to 
Table 1. See the main text and Table A.2 in the appendix for details. 
Mixed
Table D.1. Donor class
Dependent variable: Work on Hh farm
Western bilateral Multilateral
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Aid sector: 
Specification: DD Parish FE DD Parish FE DD Parish FE DD Parish FE
Ongoing aid/capita 0.09*** 0.15*** 0.05* 0.07* 0.08 -0.05 -0.10 0.15***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05)
Future aid/capita -0.00 -0.05** 0.12*** -0.25**
(0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.12)
Difference: Ongoing - Future 0.09 0.10 -0.04 0.16
F-test of difference 2.07 6.51** 0.30 3.45*
F-test of difference: p-value 0.151 0.011 0.586 0.064
Parish fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 24,986 24,986 24,986 24,986 24,986 24,986 24,986 24,986
R2 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.28
Notes:
Estimated with OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered at the parish level, in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Aid sector categories are 
based on AidData (2016a) sector codes. Human capital if AidData sector (sector code): Education (110), or Health (120). Infrastructure: Water 
supply and sanitation (140), Transport and storage (210), or Energy generation and supply (230). Official service:  Government and civil society, 
general (151), or Other social infrastructure and services (160). Agriculture: Agriculture (311). Control variables are listed in the notes to Table 1. 
See the main text and Table A.2 in the appendix for details. 
Table D.2. Aid sector
Dependent variable: Work on Hh farm
Human capital Infrastructure Official service Agriculture
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 
Specification: DD LD DD LD
Ongoing aid/capita 0.06*** 0.10 -0.02 -0.07*
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04)
Future aid/capita -0.03 0.05
(0.03) (0.03)
Lag of dependent variable 0.23*** 0.40***
(0.01) (0.02)
Difference: Ongoing - Future 0.09 -0.07
F-test of difference 6.91*** 4.19**
F-test of difference: p-value 0.009 0.041
Parish fixed effects Yes Yes
N 24,986 15,024 24,986 15,024
R2 0.19 0.31 0.21 0.40
Notes:
Unskilled Skilled
Estimated with OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered at the parish level, in parentheses, *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are listed in the notes to Table 1. See the main text 
and Table A.2 in the appendix for details. 
Table E.1. Skill-level of occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable: 
Specification: DD LD DD LD DD LD DD LD DD LD
Ongoing aid/capita -0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.06 -0.01*** -0.06*** -0.04** -0.14**
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Future aid/capita -0.00 -0.00 0.05 0.02* 0.02
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
Lag of dependent variable 0.58*** 0.12*** 0.41*** 0.38*** 0.40***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Difference: Ongoing - Future -0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06
F-test of difference 0.01 0.42 0.86 11.48 6.53
F-test of difference: p-value 0.919 0.515 0.355 0.001 0.011
Parish fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 24,986 15,024 24,986 15,024 24,986 15,024 24,986 15,024 24,986 15,024
R2 0.06 0.44 0.07 0.18 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.33
Notes:
Estimated with OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered at the parish level, in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are listed in the 
notes to Table 1. See the main text and Table A.2 in the appendix for details. 
Table E.2. Place and type of work
Off-farm 
employment
Off-farm self-
employment
Running a businessWork in Other 
household
Work in 
Government
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: 
Specification: DD LD DD LD DD LD
Ongoing aid/capita -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Future aid/capita -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Lag of dependent variable 0.15*** 0.01 0.67***
(0.06) (0.01) (0.02)
Difference: Ongoing - Future -0.00 0.00 -0.00
F-test of difference 0.14 0.14 0.00
F-test of difference: p-value 0.706 0.711 0.962
Parish fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 24,986 15,024 24,986 15,024 24,923 14,314
R2 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.66 0.83
Notes:
Estimated with OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered at the parish level, in parentheses, *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are listed in the notes to Table 1.  See the main text and Table 
A.2 in the appendix for details.
Table E.3. Unemployment, zero hours reported, and school attendance
Zero hours workedUnemployment Attending school
Median Wage 
Median Household 
Expenditures
Agricultural Sector 10,000 68,000
Industrial Sector 30,000 105,000
Service Sector 42,000 132,000
Agricultural Occupation 10,000 68,000
Industrial Occupation 18,000 102,000
Service Occupation 50,000 138,000
Notes:
Table F.1. Wages and expenditures by sector and occupation
The figures are the median of the real weekly wage (among those that have 
one), by sector or occupation, and the median of the real monthly household 
expenditures per adult equivalent, by the sector or occupation the household 
head is active in. The figures, which are in Ugandan Shillings (UGS year 
2010), are rounded. See the main text and Table A.2 in the appendix for 
details. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification: DD Parish FE DD Parish FE
Ongoing aid/capita -0.01* -0.02* -0.01** -0.01**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Future aid/capita 0.03*** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
Difference: Ongoing - Future -0.04 -0.02
F-test of difference 10.86 8.48
F-test of difference: p-value 0.001 0.004
Parish fixed effects Yes Yes
N 18,933 18,933 18,933 18,933
R2 0.33 0.45 0.36 0.47
Notes:
Dependent variable: Productivity of occupation
Estimated with OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered at the parish level, in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are listed in the notes to Table 1. See the 
main text and Table A.2 in the appendix for details. 
Table F.2. Productivity
Expenditure-basedWage-based
